We propose a model able to estimate the risk of assets in balance from aggregate data by introduc- JEL Classification: G01, G21, G32
After the burst of the housing bubble in August 2007, the financial situation in the United States and around the world has become unstable. At that time, central banks decided to take action, injecting large quantities of liquidity by purchasing securities through open market operations in order to calm the stressed interbank lending market and keep down the increasing panic.
In spite of these attempts, the crisis deepened. Soon it was clear that tools and policy undertaken by the Federal Reserve Bank were not able to define and solve the catastrophic problem originated by mortgages and their securitisation. It was the first time after the Great Depression (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) that the Fed and the US Government provided support to investment banks in an attempt to guarantee, in a consistent way, the financial system's stability.
The monetary policy intervention of the Federal Reserve reminds us of Walter Bagehot who
introduced the concept of LOLR (Lender of Last Resort). According to his point of view the LOLR has to lend money as much as necessary to solvent but illiquid financial institutions for a short term, but at a penalty rate and against acceptable collateral.
Unfortunately, as the current financial turmoil shows, it is sometimes not possible to distinguish between insolvency and illiquidity and bailouts might arise moral hazard concerns.
As the financial crisis spreads into the gigantic investment banks (Citigroup, Wachovia, Lehman Brothers, Wells Fargo), not only in the United States but also around the world, governments and central banks undertook historical rescue plans in order to help a financial system in which the slogan "too big to fail" was replaced by "panic and fear in the market".
From a financial point of view the recent crisis has shown several drawbacks of the financial system: huge problems in managing risks related to financial securities. 2 . The growth of volatility in financial markets has increased investors' risk aversion, leading to difficulties for banks liquidity, forcing deleverage. 3 . Governance problems and perverse incentives in many financial sectors. 4 . Rating agencies in conflict of interest because of their double role in consulting and evaluating issues. 5 . Regulatory and bank supervision systems unable to deal with the recent turmoil.
In table I, we compare bail-out government plans in terms of interest rate cuts, capital injections (bank recapitalization and asset purchase), lending guarantees to restore liquidity; all tools aimed to rebuild investors' confidence and calm the panic.
[Please Insert Table I around here] Almost all governments (US, UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, Australia, Denmark, Austria) have increased the amount of bank deposit guarantees. This choice remains controversial among economists that worry about moral hazard issues, because this policy may result in excessive risk taking on the part of depositors as well as the banks accepting the deposits.
In order to control moral hazard, central banks used a deposit insurance system consisting of "co-insurance", in which the guarantee provided to depositors was less than the total amount of individual deposits. This was meant to promote good governance practices.
Concerning liquidity and lending guarantees, Table I shows how measures adopted by central banks were totally different. For example in Denmark, Australia, Finland and Canada, the governments preferred not to provide liquidity to the system respecting the principle of "laissez -faire". In China, the government reduced by about 50% the amount of reserves that each bank must hold in order to stimulate the interbank lending market. France, Germany, Spain, Japan, South Korea, US and UK preferred to inject liquidity in order to bail out troubled investment banks.
Scared about short selling and speculation, central banks of most countries (Canada, US, UK, China, South Korea, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Germany, France and Spain) have banned or imposed restrictions on short selling, without considering that short sellers have a crucial role for price efficiency.
Brenner and Subrahmanyam (2009) point out how "restrictions on short selling reduce transactions in the stock market, which in turn, delays price discovery, curtails liquidity and causes prices to fall further". They also describe the impact of short selling on the liquidity risk of a given stock and its derivatives.
Lending guarantees and asset purchase have received plenty of attention, arising questions related to the insurance provided by governments to banks for the issue of new unsecured debt out to three years (Guaranteed Liability) and the potential risk of "toxic" assets.
In the US, all banks and financial institutions are eligible to issue senior unsecured loans with the guarantee provided by the FDIC 1 . According to the US program, each participant has to pay a "flat" fee of 75 basis points per annum on the entire sum of new unsecured liabilities. The maximum amount of liabilities that FDIC guarantees is about 125% of the outstanding senior unsecured liabilities issued by each financial institution over the next 3 years. Acharya and Sundarum (2008) evaluate the fair value of the guarantees and the impact that a "fair price" guarantee fee may have on taxpayers, the real creditors of the troubled banks.
They use three different alternatives for evaluating the insurance cost 2 and realize how the US scheme produces a pooling equilibrium unable to signal healthy banks and the counterparties' credit risk. Wilson (2009) , using the option pricing arguments of Merton (1974) , estimates the amount of toxic assets and explains the reasons behind the illiquidity of them. According to his point of 1 Federal Deposit Insurance Company that administers the US bail out program. 2 median 3-years CDS + 3-years swap spread; median 3-years CDS; mid point of the previous estimates view, the value of the put representing the guarantee 3 is very expensive to buy from shareholders and worthless to taxpayers.
Gross (2008) estimated the "fair value" of US mortgage assets via Black and Scholes formula (1973) . The average value of the put option embedded in all mortgages (about $3.6 thousand billion) is around 9.5% in the low volatility case and 12.7% in the high volatility case and the total losses on all US mortgages could amount to over $2 trillion. Although the logic behind all these approaches is sensible, pricing within the Black and Scholes' framework (1983) is not realistic in an illiquid market, where the government is not a "price taker".
We propose therefore a new prudential measure based on balance sheet data, the Filter Historical Spectral Asset Measure (FH-SAM) for estimating the risk of assets in balance for banks and financial institutions. Our approach combines a model based method to estimate asset variance with model-free innovations, to improve the robustness of our results. Using data provided by the Federal Reserve, we evaluate the risk of assets in balance for all US commercial banks.
The plan of our paper is as follows. In Section I, we review some important evidences related to US commercial banks. In Section II, we propose the model for evaluating the risk of assets in financial institutions. In Section III we report the estimation of the model. Our empirical results in section IV. Section V concludes. It is also called a full-service bank.
The term commercial bank is a way to distinguish it from an investment bank that does not accept deposits or provide loans to individuals. Further, a commercial bank does not maintain broker/dealer operations and it does not offer advisory services for corporate actions or restructuring processes 4 . Using data from Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, we observe a decrease of the total number of commercial banks in the United States. In Figure   I , we show the evolution of the number of US commercial banks from the first quarter of 1984 Considering the recent crisis, the above bank scenario is justified. The panic and the fear in the market have generated a bank run in which a large number of bank customers have withdrawn their deposits from their banks. As more people withdraw their deposits, the likelihood of defaults increases, and this encourages further withdrawals.
I.B Leverage, Liquidity and Commercial Bank Balance Sheet
We consider the balance sheet of a commercial bank. The key elements are the following: bank credits (to corporate, sovereign, household and financial), interbank loans (Fed Funds and Repos with Banks), cash assets (vault cash and cashing checks for costumers), other assets 5 , deposits, borrowings, other debts and owners' equity. 
Owners' Equity Other Assets
We denominate the total amount of bank credits with Credit t , the amount of interbank loans (Int − Loans t ), the amount of cash assets with Cash t , the value of other assets with O − Assets t .
From the Liability side, we name the amount of deposits with Deposit t , the value of borrowings with Borrow t , the amount of other debts with O − Debts t and the total amount of equity with Equity t . 5 it excludes the due-from position with related foreign offices Using monthly data, we report time series summary statistics for all commercial banks in the United States over the period January 1973 to February 2009.
[Please Insert Table II around here] From accounting principles, we know that the right hand side of a balance sheet has to be equal to the left hand side. So we get:
(1)
We name the left hand side of our equation as Tot − Asset t and the first three components of the right hand side equality as Liability t . So we have:
and,
Starting from these basic accounting principles, we examine the health of all US commercial banks in terms of leverage and liquidity ratios and we investigate the potential relationships between these indicators.
We define leverage (Leverage t ) as the ratio between the amount of total assets (Asset t ) to the value of equity (Equity t ). This ratio is easy to use since it requires only a cursory glance at the bank's balance sheet. Equity is simply the total amount of assets (Asset t ) minus the amount of liabilities (Liability t ) and includes the amount of non-redeemable preferred stock, the total value of common stock, capital surplus, permanent and statutary reserves and retained earnings. So we have: Following their findings, we cast more light on the evolution of the leverage ratio. In Figure   IV , we report the dynamics of total assets and the leverage ratio of all commercial banks in the Liquidity is another crucial factor in order to complete our analysis of all US commercial banks.
Liquidity in bank management is needed for two reasons: first, to satisfy demand for new loans without having to recall existing loans or realize term investments, and second, to meet both daily and seasonal swings in deposits, so that withdrawals can be met in a timely and orderly fashion.
Liquidity inspires depositor and lender confidence. Indeed as the credit crunch crisis shows, illiquidity and poor asset quality were the main cause of bank failures. Banks were forced to close (or merge with other banks) when depositors no longer had confidence in the bank's stability (bank run) .
Following Grier (2002), "liquidity is more important than asset quality because a bank with non-performing loans can continue to operate indefinitely provided that the central bank or bank regulators do not require that these assets be charged off and that the deposit levels remain stable."
We measure the liquidity using two different ratios: the first (First − Liquidity t ) relates the total amount of loans with the total amount of deposits; the second ratio (Second − Liquidity t )
relates the total amount of cash assets with the amount of deposits and borrowed funds. So we have:
The term Loans includes commercial, industrial, real estate and consumer credits, other loans and leases. A bank that is "loaned up" has a high ratio of loans to total deposit. Liquid banks have a smaller proportion of deposits in loans and more in short-term money market investments and investment securities, both of which can readily be converted into cash that can then be loaned out.
[Please Insert Figure core deposits rather than borrowed funds. Due to the lack of liquidity in the banking system, the Federal Reserve has purchased toxic assets from commercial banks with the aim of calming down the stressed banking system. During the period, the total amount of deposits has increased by about 15% (from 6371 billion to 7331 billion) and the amount of loans has increased by about 10%.
The second indicator of liquidity (Second −Liquidity t ) relates the amount of cash to the amount of deposits and borrowed funds. So we have:
After the injection of liquidity by the Federal Reserve (Septermber 2008), the second liquidity ratio increased by about 123% (from 0.039 to 0.087). Closer look to the data shows how before the credit crunch the ratio was monotonically decreasing, a strong signal that something was going wrong and that perhaps the Federal Reserve could have anticipated this catastrophic disaster 6 .
[Please Insert Figure VI around here] Now, what is the relationship between the solvency risk (leverage) and the liquidity ratios? In figure VI, we relate the first and second liquidity ratios to leverage. On the left hand side, the first liquidity ratio has been related to leverage. We can observe a negative relationship between these two indicators. It means that high is the level of illiquidity, lower will be leverage. This phenomen is justified by low capital charges on mortgage backed securities that have generated an increase in the business of these financial products and decreased the volume of loans (where the capital charges are higher) in the last few years.
On the right hand side, we capture the relationship between the second ratio of liquidity (Second-Liquidity) and the leverage ratio. We can oberve a positive relationship between these two indicators. It means that high it is the level of liquidity, higher it is leverage. Considering the recent financial crisis, in aggregate all US commercial banks suffered the liquidity problem and prefered to reduce leverage.
II. The Model
We start our evaluation of the amount of in balance risky assets 7 for all commercial banks in the United States from the previous evidences. According to , "in a financial system in which balance sheets are continuously marked to market, asset price changes appear immediately in the balance sheets of financial institutions". Although the intuition provided by the authors is sensible, problems can arise when the market-based measurement does not reflect the underlying true value. This can happen during volatile periods. Indeed during the credit crunch crisis, financial institutions were forced to sell assets. Liquidity was low and there was fear in the market. The selling price of a bank's assets was much lower than the market value, generating a slight decrease in the shareholders' equity 8 . Being aware of this concern, we start the construction of the model using data from the balance sheet of a financial institution. Let the monthly percentage variation of total assets (r t ) be:
Closer look at the time series of the percentage variation of monthly total assets reveals the presence of a long term trend component (potential seasonal effects) that may lead to inconsistent estimates for the parameters of the model that we are going to build. In order to eliminate this trend, we use the Hodrick Prescott Filter (HP, 1997), aiming to isolate the short term component (c t ) from the long term component (τ t ) 9 .
Under the historical measure P, we model the short term component c t of asset returns, using an asymmetric Exponential GARCH(1,1) specification (Nelson 1991) with an empirical innovation density generated with the Filter Historical Simulation technique (Barone-Adesi et al.
1998).
So we have:
where,
The conditional mean variation is E[c t ] = µ, 10 the error process ε t is parametrized as
8
In April 2009, in order to avoid the forced liquidation, the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) has approved new rules of evaluation based on a price that would be received in an orderly market.
The conditional variance process h t follows an Exponential GARCH(1,1) model and it is described by the following equation:
where {z t } t=1,..,T is a sequence of detrended and scaled asset return innovations. If φ > 0, a deviation of | z t−1 |from its expected value E [| z t−1 |] implies the variance of ε t to be larger than otherwise. The term ξ if smaller than zero accounts for the asymmetry effect, i.e negative surprises (z t−1 < 0) raise the future asset volatility more than positive surprises (z t−1 ≥ 0)of the same absolute magnitude.
In order to construct the empirical distribution of standardized detrended asset returns, we draw with replacement from our own sample of past standardized residuals, {ẑ t−w } s w=1 . Following Barone-Adesi et. al (1998), the random drawing is generated using a discrete uniform random variable distributed from 1 to s. This procedure permits to choose which w and so whichẑ t−w to pick from the sample of our past standardized residuals and describe the empirical distribution density of detrended asset variations. Further, we select the number of times Q in which we draw with replacement from the set of past standardized detrended asset returns and we fix the number of months K. Now, we calculate the K − month percentage variation of the short term component c t of asset returns, in the following way:
We collect the Q hypothetical K − month percentage variation of detrended asset returns in a set {ĉ i,t:t+K } 
where, ∑ Q i=1 ω i = 1 for any finite Q. So, we obtain:
where the indicator function takes value 1 if the argument is true and zero otherwise. Further, the value at risk VaR p t:t+K is computed as follows:
with p = 0, .., 1.
The choice of the percentile p at a given time horizon will depend on the policy that a central bank would like to undertake in order to estimate the risky of assets in a financial institution.
From one side, a value of p close to 1 will indicate a generous forebearance policy undertaken by the central bank; to the other side, a lower value of p will be a sign of a strict forebearance policy. Following Stulz (2008), we think that only an analysis based on different scenarios and horizons K might shed more light on the policy that a central bank might undertake for estimating the risk of toxic assets in a financial institution.
Given the choice of the percentile p and the time horizon K , we estimate the risk of assets (FH − Risk − Asset) in balance (in $ billion), in the following way:
III. Estimation of the Model
In Table III , we report the estimated parameters related to the EGARCH(1,1) specification, used for computing the Filtered Historical Spectral Asset Measure (FH-SAM). The parameters κ, α, ξ , φ in the EGARCH(1,1) model are highly significant. Moreover, no significance is found for the constant µ in the conditional mean equation 11 .
[Please Insert Table III To measure the goodness of fit of our model, in Table IV we report several in-sample and outof-sample statistics: the log-likelihood statistics (Log-likelihood), the R-squared (R 2 ), the root mean square error (RMSE) and the mean absolute error (MAE).
[Please Insert Table IV around 
IV. Empirical Results: Risk Measures for all US Commercial Banks
We apply our model, using the time series of monthly total assets for all US commercial banks We assign bigger weights to worse cases, improving the reliability of the tail index estimator We cast more light on the balance sheet of all US commercial banks and we construct the Filtered Historical Spectral Equity Measure (FH-SEM), with the same methodology used for computing the FH-SAM measure 16 .
[Please Insert Table V around here] 
Conclusions
The paper extends the debate in the literature about the tools for evaluating the risky of assets policy; to the other side, a lower value of p will be a sign of a strict forebearance policy. 16 Indeed, we model the percentage detrended monthly variation of shareholder's equity using an EGARCH(1,1) specification. As the previous methodology, we use the filtered historical simulation (Barone-Adesi et al. (1998)) for constructing the empirical distribution of hypothetical future detrended equity variations and we calculate the FH-SEM at different critical values ( 90%, 95%, 99%) and different time horizons (6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 36 The Table ( The figure shows the relationship between leverage and liquidity ratios for all commercial banks in the United States, from January 1973 to February 2009. The first liquidity ratio is computed relating the amount of loans to the total amount of deposits; the second liquidity ratio is computed relating the amount of cash to the total amount of deposits and borrowed funds; the leverage is equal to the amount of total assets to the amount of equity. Table IV The Table reports several in-sample and out-of-sample statistics. The log-likelihood statistics (Log-likelihood), the R-squared (R 2 ), the root mean square error (RMSE), the mean absolute error (MAE).In particular the last two measures capture the forecasting power of the EGARCH ( The figure plots the conditional standard deviations, the ordinary and standardized residuals related to the amount of detredend monthly assets. 
